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THE SCOPE OF THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
VERN COUNTRYMAN*
In recent years there has been much talk in the legal profes-
sion about the lawyer's professional responsibility. Leaders of the
profession have expressed concern that too many of our number
do not understand, much less discharge, the responsibilities of the
profession. This concern is not one nurtured solely in the ivory
towers inhabited by law professors; it is shared by practicing law-
yers, judges, and other members of the profession in public office. In-
deed, if credit is to be allocated for stimulating concern in this area,
the major portion must go to the practitioners rather than to the
academicians.
In 1958 a Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility
established by the American Bar Association and the Association
of American Law Schools issued a final report in which it under-
took to formulate a definition of the lawyer's professional responsi-
bility.' Significantly, the report recognized responsibilities in the
area of private service to the client and also in an area of public
service, and included in the area of public service was a recognition
of the lawyer's responsibility as a guardian of due process of law,
his responsibility to make legal service available for all, his responsi-
bility for representation of unpopular causes, his responsibility for
leadership in legal reform, and his responsibility to retain inde-
pendence of thought and action as a citizen. That statement was
officially adopted by both of the organizations sponsoring the Con-
ference. Later in the same year the first Arden House Conference
on Continuing Legal Education, sponsored by the Joint Committee
on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute and
the American Bar Association, resolved that continuing legal edu-
cation programs should in the future emphasize problems of pro-
fessional responsibility to clients and to the public. 3
* Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. I have drawn heavily upon a
position paper, "Implementation of Education for Professional Responsibility," which
my colleague, David R. Herwitz, and I prepared for the Second National Conference
on the Continuing Education of the Bar, held at Arden House, December 14-17, 1963.
These remarks were delivered as the Arant Memorial Lecture at the Ohio State
University College of Law on February 18, 1964.
' The Report has been published in 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958) and 7 J. Pub. L.
462 (1958).
2 84 A.B.A. Rep. 541-42 (1959) ; A.A.L.S. Proceedings 33-34 (1958).
3 Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education, Continuing Legal Education
for Professional Competence and Responsibility 18 (1959). The second Arden House
Conference reaffirmed that resolution. 32 L. Week 2307-08 (1963).
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Meanwhile, the National Council on Legal Clinics, administer-
ing an 800,000 dollar grant from the Ford Foundation, has spon-
sored the preparation of three sets of teaching materials on profes-
sional responsibility 4 as well as experimental projects devoted to
the same end in fifteen different law schools.5 These projects range
from internship programs with law and law-connected agencies
through clinical work with individual problems to a pilot study in
the comprehensive use of the pervasive approach in law school in-
struction for professional responsibility.' None of these projects has
yet progressed to the point where its product is available for study
or evaluation, but significant contributions may be forthcoming
within the next few years.
To any one who studies the record of this latter-day concern
with professional responsibility, one point emerges clearly. Those
who have addressed themselves to the problem do not proceed from
any generally accepted definition of the scope of professional respon-
sibility. That this should be so is understandable. The concept of
professional responsibility must derive its content from the mores,
the attitudes, the expectations of a given time and place. The re-
sponsibilities of a profession, whether conceived by its members or
by others, are the product of the society of which the profession is
a part. The concept of professional responsibility is, therefore, a
continuously evolving one. Probably few would accept, as a compre-
hensive definition of the lawyer's professional responsibility today,
what seemed to Sir Francis Bacon adequate nearly four centuries
ago:
I hold every man a debtor to his profession; from the which as
men of course do seek to receive countenance and profit, so
ought they of duty to endeavor themselves by way of amends
to be a help and ornament thereto. This is performed in some
degree by the honest and liberal practice of a profession ...
but much more is this performed if a man be able to visit and
strengthen the roots and foundation of the science itself . ...
4 Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Professional Responsibility and the Ad-
ministration of Criminal Justice (1961); Sacks, Defending the Unpopular Client
(1961) and Countryman, The Lawyer in Modern Society (1962). See also A.A.L.S.,
Selected Readings on the Legal Profession (Boyer, Harno, Mathews & Bradway ed.
1962).
5 The first seven of the sponsored projects are described in the Council's publi-
cation, Education for Professional Responsibility in the Law School-Preliminary
Reports on Seven Experimental Projects (1962). All are briefly summarized in Lam-
born, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility 11-13 (1963).
6 See Smedley, "The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale-'The Vanderbilt
Experiment,'" 15 J. Legal Ed. 435 (1963).
7 Preface to Bacon, Maxims of the Law (1596).
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Perhaps no comprehensive definition, designed to reach the
outer limits, is either feasible or desirable. But current efforts to in-
still a greater sense of professional responsibility can hardly meet
with measurable success unless a consensus can be reached among
those making the effort on the main contours of the concept of that
responsibility. While such a consensus can be reached only as the
product of discussion and debate, the effort here will be to formulate
the minimum ingredients of a modern concept of the lawyer's pro-
fessional responsibility.
Included without elaboration or argument is the entire area of
private responsibilities to the client-such matters as those relating
to taking a case, the lawyer's control of the methods and tactics of
solution, withdrawal from the case, conflict of interest, privileged
communications, fees, and custody of clients' funds. This area, com-
monly embraced within the concept of "legal ethics," would no
doubt be included in the most limited definition of professional re-
sponsibility. There is no dissent from Bacon's view that the lawyer
must pursue the "honest and liberal practice" of his profession. Be-
yond this undisputed core of responsibility, we are brought to the
areas of "public" responsibility, the primary focus of this article. A
comprehensive definition of professional responsibility must recog-
nize public responsibilities in at least six areas.
RESPONSIBILITIES TO LEGAL TRIBUNALS
That loyalty to the client's cause is to be tempered by some
countervailing obligation to the legal tribunal to which the cause
is presented is generally recognized. But the problem of resolving
these competing demands is one of the most difficult the lawyer
must face. Its solution may vary with the nature of the tribunal.
Courts
The Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsi-
bility 8 presents a reasoned defense of the advocate's role and the
adversary process in terms of relieving the deciding tribunal from
the obligation of framing the issues and presenting the evidence, so
that it may "come to the hearing uncommitted." The late Judge
Jerome Frank described the adversary system as a substitute for
self-help designed principally to avoid "private pitched battles."'
The late Charles Curtis described it as an effort to "give the alge-
braic maximum of satisfaction to both parties."1 0 Differences in
8 Supra note 1.
9 Frank, Courts on Trial 5-7 (1950).
10 Curtis, It's Your Law 3 (1954).
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conception may lead to different notions about the advocate's obli-
gation to the court.
There seems to be a consensus that Samuel Williston was justi-
fied, as counsel for the defendant in a civil case, in withholding
material evidence which plaintiff's counsel had failed to discover.1
Are the obligations of the prosecuting attorney different? There is
no agreement about an obligation to call the court's attention to
adverse decisions. 2 And there seems to be little agreement with
Curtis' suggestion that a lawyer's obligation to his client may on
occasion require him to lie to the court.' 3
Legislatures
There are here two related but in some respects quite dis-
similar areas in which the lawyer functions before the legislature.
There is, first, the legislative hearing to which the lawyer may
accompany his client or in which he may appear as a witness in
behalf of his client. This is not the typical adversary proceeding
of the courtroom. Adverse interests may or may not be represented.
To the extent that they are not, are the lawyer's obligations of
candor to the tribunal increased? The tribunal has not been freed
of the burden of formulating issues and presenting evidence so that
it may come to the hearing uncommitted. Since this is so, should
the lawyer be allowed greater leeway in his efforts in his client's
behalf? Canon 26, advising the lawyer to observe the "same prin-
ciples of ethics which justify his appearance before the Courts" and
to use no means "other than those addressed to the reason and
understanding, to influence action," provides slight guidance.
Secondly, there is the lawyer's function as lobbyist. The term
is here used in its neutral sense-excluding all connotations of
bribery and corruption.' Here, the lawyer for a private client is
even further removed from the adversary proceeding in his ex parte
contacts with legislators and their staffs and with administrative
and executive offices whose positions may influence the legislation.
What is the obligation of counsel to take account of unrepresented
interests, not only in these contacts, but as he is given opportunity
to participate in the drafting of bills, and in the writing of commit-
tee reports? If counsel for the legislature may properly resort to
11Id. at 17-20. See opinion No. 309 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of
the New York County Lawyers' Association, in William Nelson Cromwell Foundation,
Opinions of Committees on Professional Ethics of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York and the New York County Lawyers' Association 708 (1956).
12 See In re Greenberg. 15 N.J. 132, 104 A2d 46 (1954).
13 Curtis, op. cit. supra note 10, at 10-20. Cf. Drinker, "Some Remarks on Mr.
Curtis' 'The Ethics of Advocacy,'" 4 Stan. L. Rev. 349 (1952).
14 See Horsky, The Washington Lawyer 33 (1962).
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deliberate ambiguity in draftsmanship and to carefully placed evi-
dence of legislative intent, as Dean Frank Newman of California
has contended,' 5 what of counsel for the private client? Again, Can-
on 26 offers little help.
Administrative agencies
That part of the administrative process which is somewhat im-
precisely described as "adjudication" would appear to involve prob-
lems similar to those of the lawyer who appears in court, save for
the fact that the impropriety of the ex parte contact seems not to
be nearly so well appreciated where administrative agencies are
concerned. That part described as "rule-making" seems to present
problems for the lawyer similar to those arising in the legislative
process.
But there appear also to be exceptions in both instances. The
requirement of separation of prosecuting and deciding functions and
the prohibition against ex parte contacts in the federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act do not apply to adjudications involving "licens-
ing." 6 And rule-making is broadly defined to include, inter alia,
rate-making.' 7 Thus the lawyer may find himself in a licensing or
rate-making procedure where adverse interests are not represented
and where ex parte contacts with the administrative tribunal are
not forbidden by law. It may be, as a House Committee has recently
concluded, that counsel for an applicant in a pipeline licensing case,
where the rate of return may also be fixed and where there are no
competing applicants, does not violate the law by ex parte contacts
with members of the licensing commission designed to affect their
action on the application and the rate of return.'8 But are questions
of professional responsibility resolved by the Committee's conclu-
sions that, since there were no competing applicants, the only in-
terests affected by the ex parte contacts were those of the staff of
the Commission, which also had ex parte contact with the Commis-
sion, or those of the Commission itself? Can one agree with the
Committee that, "because of the nonexistence of any other party
having an interest to be affected, the contacts, in the strictest sense
of the term, may well be considered as not ex parte in the sense
normally condemned"? 'I" Once more, Canon 26 is of little aid.
The questions raised are pertinent to responsibility to legal
15 Newman, "A Legal Look at Congress and the State Legislatures," in Legal
Institutions Today and Tomorrow 67, 75-77 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
16 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1958).
1760 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1958).
18H.R. Rep. No. 2238, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-24 (1961). Cf. Sangamon Valley
Television Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
19 Id. at 24.
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tribunals but it would be fruitless here to attempt to provide an-
swers which would be generally acceptable. And the mere fact that
this is so seems to be sufficient to demonstrate that there is a pro-
fessional responsibility to seek a consensus on such problems.
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LAW REFORM
The profession can claim a general competence on all attempts
to solve man's problems by resort to law, and in a number of areas
the profession, or some of its members, can claim a special compe-
tence. What obligations and what limitations arise from compe-
tence of either sort? A number of current examples are illustrative.
Procedure
The profession has already, by virtue of its special competence,
made a substantial contribution to the reform of civil and admin-
istrative procedure. Similar reform may be overdue in other areas.
Edward Bennett Williams has recently complained that the
defendant in a criminal proceeding does not under the federal
Criminal Rules have available to him the discovery proceedings
available to a defendant in a civil case.20 If there is merit to the
complaint, is there a professional responsibility not merely to lend
technical aid in drafting necessary amendments to the Criminal
Rules, but also to take the initiative and prepare and present the
case for reform?
The federal Administrative Procedure Act's requirements for
adjudication do not apply to selection and tenure of government
employees.2 1 As a consequence the federal loyalty-security program
operates without procedural safeguards which would be required in
most other administrative proceedings. In 1956 a special committee
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York published a
report which carefully reviewed the operation of this program and
made specific recommendations for its improvement.2 These recom-
mendations have been substantially ignored. Is there a professional
responsibility to continue to seek reform in this area? The Com-
mittee which prepared the report thought there was:
Some may think it presumptuous for private citizens to take upon
themselves the responsibility for proposing to our government
far-reaching changes in this field. We deem it appropriate that
members of the Bar should do this. Indeed, as we conceive it,
our duty as lawyers requires us to do so. The Bar of the United
20 Williams, One Man's Freedom 163-85 (1962).
2160 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
22 Report of the Special Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1956).
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States has always been, and must always be, alert in the protection
of the liberties on which our country was founded as well as of
other measures essential to national security. It is so, in fact,
with lawyers in every country where freedom exists or is emerg-
ing. It is only in the countries where freedom is rejected that
the right and duty of the Bar to protect the liberties of the citizens
are denied or suppressed.28
No procedures of comparable importance in this country are
less uniform and less formalized than those of legislative committees.
In 1954 a special committee of the American Bar Association pub-
lished a careful study of the procedures of Congressional investigat-
ing committees which found abuses of substance and of procedure
constituting serious violations of the rights of citizens in some in-
vestigations. The report recommended that the American Bar As-
sociation endorse adoption by Congress of a uniform code of pro-
cedure for all investigating committees and carefully detailed the
essentials of such a code. 4 No action has been taken on this recom-
mendation. Is there a professional obligation to continue to press
for reform here?
Personnel
The selection of the men who will exercise the powers of govern-
ment is obviously of no less importance than the formulation of the
laws they will enact or enforce. By reason of its familiarity with
the operations of government and with those who operate it, the
bar may claim a special competence in this area also. Opportunities
for discharge of professional responsibility may currently exist in
all three branches of government.
In 1937 the American Bar Association endorsed the essentials
of the Missouri plan for selection and removal of judges as a substi-
tute for direct election.2 Since that time only six states have
adopted such a plan for selection of some or all of their judges.2"
Admittedly, there is a serious obstacle in the abiding faith-not
confined to laymen-in the elective process as a means of holding
all public officials to public accountability. Certainly the faith is
bolstered by the arrogance of an occasional federal or other life-
tenure judge. And this faith persists although it is probably largely
true, as Al Smith said, that the elective process "means the selection
of judges by political leaders and the ratification of their selection
23 Id. at 24-25.
24 A.B.A. Special Committee on Individual Rights as Affected by National Se-
curity, Report on Congressional Investigations 35-40 (1954).
25 62 A.B.A. Rep. 893 (1937).
26 American B. News, Nov. 15, 1962, p. 1.
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by an electorate who are not really in a position to pass upon the
legal and other abilities of the individual." 27
There are difficulties too in trying to demonstrate the superior-
ity of the Missouri plan. The argument in its behalf seems to be
entirely a priori. So far as I know, no empirical study has been
made. Such a study would be difficult, but until it is done has the
bar discharged its professional responsibility? Has it properly pre-
sented the case for the Missouri plan? Can it even be confident that
it has selected the best plan?
Bar associations frequently consider it appropriate to express
their views on the qualifications of candidates for judicial office. In
1949 the American Bar Association, through its Committee on the
Federal Judiciary, established a procedure whereby it could express
its views on the qualifications of prospective nominees to federal
judgeships. Justification for this procedure rests upon the bar's
special competence to judge the qualifications for the office and its
special ability to obtain objective evaluations of the qualifications
of prospective nominees, who are invariably lawyers. While the
action taken by bar associations on such matters is occasionally
dismaying, and it is arguable that those who profess to speak for
the membership often do not do so and that it is wrong to formalize
a procedure whereby their views become decisive, the claim to
special competence seems sufficiently valid to justify the continued
interest of bar associations in judicial appointments and elections.
Indeed, a similar interest in at least some of the appointments and
elections of administrative officials should be evinced as a facet of
professional responsibility. The analogy cannot be pushed too far,
but there are a variety of administrative offices encompassing ad-
judicatory functions where a claim to special professional compe-
tence could be made, at least where the prospective nominees are
lawyers, as they frequently are. If the professional responsibility
arises from the special competence, does it not to this extent carry
over to administrative appointments also?
Now that Baker v. Carr2s has opened the way for judicial
examination of legislative apportionment under the equal protection
clause, a host of difficult questions are presented. What standards
are to be found in the equal protection clause? Should the same
standards really apply to both houses of the state legislatures? How
is the evidence to be collected and presented in order properly to
explore such questions? In what states do existing apportionments
seem to justify litigating these questions? How is this apparently
27 Smith, The Citizen and His Government 86 (1935).
28369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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expensive sort of litigation to be financed? Here, again, the bar can
properly claim a special competence to deal with such questions.
Does this fact imply a professional responsibility to see that they
are dealt with competently?
SUBSTANTIVE LAW
The reach should not exceed the capacity to perform, and some
caution should be exercised in attempting to define the limits of
professional responsibility in the area of substantive law reform.
But here other areas of special competence can be identified, for
example, tax reform and civil rights.
Few other than the tax specialist will claim familiarity with
the intricacies of the Internal Revenue Code. Indeed, only a few
lawyers will claim familiarity with so limited a feature of the Code
as the ubiquitous federal tax lien." The man with a tax problem,
and his lawyer, will be seeking his version of tax reform. Hence it
is, as Dean Griswold has said, that "we get hundreds of detailed,
intricate provisions in our tax law, each of which is primarily the
result of the fact that a person had a problem." 30 But unless we are
willing to commit the public interest solely to the only other people
knowledgeable in the area-the Internal Revenue Service and a few
Congressmen-qualified members of the profession must recognize
a public responsibility for tax reform.
When the Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Re-
sponsibility spoke of the lawyer as "a guardian of due process," it
apparently was referring to procedural due process. But should the
lawyer in a legal system committed to equality before the law be
less a guardian of the equal protection clause and of the due process
prohibition of arbitrary discrimination? When equality before the
law manifestly does not obtain, is there no less a professional re-
sponsibility to seek reform than where the procedures of the law are
unfair? At the very least, when Congress is considering the exercise
of its authority to enact implementing legislation under the four-
teenth amendment, is there not a professional responsibility to par-
ticipate in the public deliberations?
The lawyer, in the full context of his professional role and in
the full reach of his traditional function, is devoted to the peaceful
solution of disputes. His experience reaches to disputes between
individuals and groups, to their disputes with the state, and to
29 See American Bar Association, "Report of the Special Committee on Federal
Liens," 84 A.B.A. Rep. 645 (1959).
30 Joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education, op. cit. supra note 3, at 136.
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disputes between states. His training and his experience counsel
that for all such disputes peaceful solutions may be found, no
matter how irreconcilable the differences appear to be nor how
intransigent the disputants. At least where disputes between na-
tions are involved, there can be today few lawyers indeed who
would even seriously consider counseling a resort to force as an
alternative to submission to existing machinery for peaceful solu-
tion. The instances in the past where lawyers have joined with
others in resorting to force instead only serve to emphasize the
preferability of the peaceful solution.
Perhaps the lawyer's training and experience are transferable
to the field of international relations. Perhaps in today's world,
when mankind is threatened with extinction by any attempt at
forcible solution of international disputes, the lawyer has some
special endowments of inestimable value: a willingness to assume
that any dispute is somehow susceptible to peaceful solution; an
instinct, or a habit, of searching for the common ground where such
solutions may be found; the flexibility and discrimination which
permit the modification of views and objectives necessary for
negotiated settlement; the experience with institutions and pro-
cedures for settlement which by design and in operation have almost
invariably avoided resort to force.
Perhaps these attributes are not transferable. Perhaps lawyers,
or too many lawyers, when shifted to the international sphere, shed
their prior training and experience and adopt the attitudes and
standards of the soldier and the diplomat for whom, by training
and experience, war has always been an alternative to peaceful
solution. Can lawyers afford the assumption that the legal profes-
sion has no responsibility to offer its traditional talents and skills
to the attempt to preserve peace in a world unlikely to survive
without it? The American Bar Association, as evidenced by its
long and energetic program for World Peace Through Law,
obviously has concluded that they cannot. There must be few who
will quarrel with that conclusion, or who will doubt that the Athens
Conference of lawyers from 105 nations was a manifestation of the
highest order of professional responsibility.
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DEFENSE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Those who administer the legal system are, of course, properly
subject to responsible criticism and cannot hope to escape irrespon-
sible criticism. But the criticism which, through ignorance or by
design, goes so far as to make unwarranted imputations of improper
motives, or to distort the effect or the significance of official acts,
may amount to more than an injustice to the individual official or
1965]
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officials involved. It may undermine public confidence in, and foster
misunderstanding and confusion about, the proper functioning of
our legal processes. So, also, methods have been left open and must
be left open for basic changes in our legal system. But proposals for
such changes may be so presented as not to reveal their full signifi-
cance, or may be inspired by ignorance or misunderstanding of the
institutions and processes which they would change. Obviously, a
correct public understanding of the issues is desirable.
The legal profession properly claims a special competence in
this area. Does that competence carry with it a responsibility to
set the record straight? Consider the following situations:
(1) An influential Senator, or a Governor, charges that Su-
preme Court decisions involving the first amendment rights of
Communists or alleged Communists, or decisions involving ques-
tions of racial discrimination under the equal protection clause,
are influenced by the Justices' sympathy for Communism. The
charges are backed by nothing more than the fact that some of the
first amendment decisions were favorable to Communists, or ex-
Communists or alleged Communists, or that some of the opponents
of racial discrimination are alleged to be Communists. Is there
a professional obligation to combat distortion by pointing out the
discrepancy between the charges and the proof, by explaining the
function of the Court when such cases come before it, by appraising
the significance of a decision, perhaps by identifying the rational
considerations leading to a decision either way? 31
(2) A state constitutional amendment is proposed to exclude
from the guaranty of jury trial in criminal prosecutions all cases
where the charge is one of "subversive activity," a category which
may or may not be defined in the proposed amendment. Are the
lawyers of the state, as "guardians of due process," obliged to
explain that the proposal is contrary to the time-tested traditions
of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, that on rational grounds it puts the
cart before the horse, that it confuses questions of punishing the
guilty with questions of proof of guilt?
(3) A few years ago frequent invocations of the privilege
against self-incrimination by witnesses called before Congressional
committees investigating subversion produced reactions typified by
the epithet "fifth-amendment Communist," by aspersions on those
who "took the fifth" and by a general hostility to the privilege
against self-incrimination. Was it the obligation of lawyers as
"guardians of due process" to take on the burden, largely assumed
31 Senator Javits and Professor Dorsen thought there was. See Dorsen, "Senator
Eastland's Attack on the United States Supreme Court: An Analysis and Response,"
111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 693 (1963).
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by one member of the profession,32 of attempting to counter this
attitude by an exposition of the historical origins and the present
function of the privilege as a vital part of our Bill of Rights and of
the adversary system of justice?
(4) The General Assembly of the States, a forum of the Coun-
cil of State Governments, is currently sponsoring amendments to
the federal constitution which would: (a) change the amending
process to permit the initiation of amendments without any partici-
pation by Congress; (b) exclude from the reach of the federal
judicial power any controversy concerning state legislative appor-
tionment; (c) create a Court of the Union, composed of the chief
justices of the fifty states, to review any Supreme Court decision
relating to the rights reserved to the states or to the people by the
Constitution. The American Bar Association, speaking for 114,000
of some 250,000 lawyers in the country, is on record as opposing
each of these proposals.3 3 Is this enough, or are there additional
responsibilities to promote and to participate in the "great national
debate" on these proposals for which the Chief Justice of the United
States has called?
Each of these examples seems to present an instance in which
the legal profession, by virtue of its training and experience, has a
better understanding of the issues than does most of the general
public. From this special competence should follow a special obliga-
tion to contribute to the public understanding of the issues.
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION
As "guardians of due process," and as a licensed monopoly,
lawyers must certainly bear a special responsibility to provide ade-
quate legal representation for all. In part, the problems in this
area relate to providing legal assistance in difficult situations. In
part they relate to formulating and enforcing measures designed
to insure technical competence. And in part they relate to defining
and guarding the area in which technical competence is required.
Providing counsel for tte needy
As of June 1, 1960, some 200 cities with a combined population
of eighty million were served by legal aid offices, and an additional
128 communities with a combined population of twenty-three mil-
lion were served by volunteer panels of lawyers. Between 400,000
and 450,000 needy cases per year were served by legal aid offices;
perhaps another 11,000 were served by volunteer panels.3" The
32 See Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955).
33 See 49 A.B.A.J. 984, 986-88 (1963).
34 Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States 12 (Supp. 1961).
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remaining forty-five per cent of the population resides in areas
without legal aid service. Whether this data indicates 350,000 to
400,000 needy cases dependent solely upon the donated services of
individual lawyers has not been determined.
Although it has been estimated that approximately sixty per
cent of those charged with crime cannot afford to employ counsel,
only a handful of legal aid offices handle criminal cases. While
public defender offices function in about one hundred localities,
some forty counties with populations in excess of 400,000 have no
such services.35 The assigned counsel system, under which the burden
frequently falls on the youngest and least experienced lawyers, is
still employed to meet the needs of the indigent accused in areas
occupied by over half the total population of the states.3 In many
states the appointment of counsel has not been required in non-
capital cases and in several it has not been considered authorized.3 7
The decision of the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwrigt,3s
finding such a requirement in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, lends constitutional compulsion to the
urgency of the problem. The Ford Foundation has recently made
grants totaling 2,500,000 dollars for study of and experimentation
with methods to improve and extend legal services for indigent
persons accused of crime.39
To meet the needs of those of modest means able to make
some payment for legal services, about 200 local bar associations
maintain a Lawyer Referral Service. A 1961 questionnaire survey
to which about half of these services responded indicated that there
were about 82,000 applicants and 59,000 referrals during that year.40
The bar is'justly proud of the growth of the Legal Aid move-
ment and of its role in support of that growth. But that movement
has not yet solved the problem and obviously there are formidable
obstacles to its success in rural areas. The Dean of the Yale Law
School has said that the "provision of legal services to the poor, both
in civil and in criminal matters, is in most communities scandalously
inadequate. And for that failure we of the Bar are primarily
responsible." 41
35 Id. at 14; American B. News, March 15, 1963, p. 2.
36 See Special Committee of the Association of the Bar of New York City and the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association, Equal Justice for the Accused (1959).
37 See Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 84 (1955) ; "The Right
To Counsel: A Symposium," 45 Minn. L. Rev. 693 (1961).
38372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39 American B. News, March 15, 1963, p. 1.
4 0 A.B.A. Committee on Lawyer Referral Service, 1961 Survey Results, The Law.
Referral Bull. (July 15, 1961).
4 1 Rostow, The Lawyer and His Client, 48 A.B.A.J. 146, 148 (1962).
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Legal representation of the unpopular
In the early period of the cold war this problem manifested
itself principally as one of obtaining representation for those accused
of some connection with the Communist movement. In Cleveland,
Denver, Philadelphia and perhaps other cities, the organized bar
came forward to provide highly competent counsel for the defense
of Smith Act defendants.42 But there are less comforting reports.
Judge Wyzanski told the first Arden House Conference that when
his court called upon four leading law firms to supply counsel in a
similar case "none of the men named by any of those four firms
was of an age that would entitle him to be invited to this confer-
ence." 43 A former president of the California bar has reported a
series of incidents where lawyers in his state were attacked for the
political views of their clients and received inadequate support from
the bar.44 And a 1959 survey of the students of one law school
indicated that, while virtually all believed that a Communist was
entitled to counsel when tried on criminal charges or in legislative
hearings, almost half did not believe they would take such a case
and more than half did not believe their preceptors would do so.45
Today there are similarly disturbing reports about the diffi-
culties of obtaining legal representation for those involved in litiga-
tion over civil rights in the South. The Department of Justice
reports that few white lawyers will represent Negroes in these mat-
ters and that there are too few Negro lawyers to handle the load.46
These reports are confirmed by Ernest Angell, Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union,4' and
by the American Bar Association's Committee on the Bill of
Rights.48
In 1953, at the height of the difficulties about representation of
those accused of Communist affiliation, the American Bar Associa-
tion adopted a resolution reaffirming "the right of defendants to
the benefit of assistance of counsel and the duty of the bar to pro-
vide such aid even to the most unpopular defendants" and pledg-
ing the continued efforts of the Association "to educate the
42See Stone, Legal Education and Public Responsibility 151-55 (1959) ; Goodrich,
"The Philadelphia Plan," 20 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 733 (1959); Seymour, "The Bar as
Lawmaker," in Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow 184-85 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
43joint Committee on Continuing Legal Education, op. cit. supra note 3, at 158.
44 Ball, "Freedom of the Bar," 32 J.S.B. California 109 (1957).
45 Olender, "Let Us Admit Impediments," 20 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 749 (1959).
46N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1961, p. 44; Chicago Sun-Times, Nov. 26, 1962, p. 16.
47N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1961, p. 8E.
4887 A.B.A. Rep. 578 (1962); 86 A.B.A. Rep. 474, 476-78 (1961). See also
Downs & Goldman, "The Obligation of Lawyers to Represent Unpopular Defendants,"
9 How. LJ. 49 (1963).
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profession and the public on the rights and duties of a lawyer in
representing any client, regardless of the unpopularity of either the
client or his cause." " Obviously, this commitment has not yet
been discharged.
Obviously, also, a broader commitment is needed if the legal
rights of the unpopular accused are to be protected, as the tragic
assassination of President Kennedy demonstrated. The Dallas
County Bar Association is to be complimented on its prompt proffer
of legal counsel to the accused assassin. But why did not the Dallas
Bar Association, or the Texas Bar Association, or the American
Bar Association, or any bar association move equally promptly to
protest the scandalous performance of the Dallas police department
and the news media in generating an atmosphere which most prob-
ably would have made a fair trial of the accused impossible regard-
less of the adequacy of his counsel and which most probably led
to his murder instead? The answer apparently is that we are still so
unaware of our responsibilities as "guardians of due process" that
no bar association was impelled or equipped to act.49a
Adequate competent representation for all
Problems of quantity as well as problems of quality are in-
volved here. As to quantity, new admissions to practice which were
eighty-nine per one million of population in 1949,50 have declined
fairly steadily and were only fifty-eight per one million in 1960.51
The American Bar Association's special committee to study current
needs in the field of legal education reported in 1961 that, while it
had not been able to determine whether there was a present short-
age of lawyers, "there is evidence that a shortage will arise unless
remedial action is taken." 52 Many lawyers probably would disagree
with that conclusion, but the problem warrants further study.
As to quality, the problems are manifold. There is evidence
that superior college students are attracted in much greater numbers
to mathematics, the natural sciences, political science and interna-
tional affairs than to law.53 In part at least, this is probably due to
the inadequate scholarship resources of the law schools, which in
1960 totaled slightly over 2,000,000 dollars and was sufficient to
aid slightly over ten percent of the students enrolled in law school.
Actually, the situation is worse than the over-all figures indicate.
49 78 A.B.A. Rep. 133 (1953).
49a Since these remarks were delivered, I have been advised by Judge Walter
E. Craig that in his then capacity as A.B.A. President he promptly telegraphed pro-
tests to Dallas authorities but that these protests were neither heeded nor publicized.
50 Smith, "Admissions to the Bar in 1958 and 1959," 46 A.B.AJ. 1201 (1960).
51 American B. News, December 15, 1961, P. 4.
52 86 A.B.A. Rep. 703, 706 (1961).
53 Id. at 708.
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Total resources were divided fifty-fifty between nine schools on the
one hand and the one hundred fourteen additional schools reporting
on the other hand, and eighty of the latter group of schools had
funds ranging "from less than 10,000 dollars per school down
to nothing whatsoever in a significant number of them." 54 This
problem is now under consideration by both the American Bar
Association's Committee to Study Financing in the Field of Edu-
cation and its Section of Legal Education. 5
Other problems go to the nature of legal education. Debate
continues between the advocates of more "practical" training in
law schools rl and those who oppose it,57 as well as on the feasibility
of prescribing a course of prelegal study.6 The financial problems of
law schools include the fact that the national median salary of
full-time law teachers in 1958 was 8,250 dollars, "not much more
than the present starting salary in major law firms in New York
City for young men of good scholastic record freshly out of law
school." rl This situation has been called "a threat to legal educa-
tion"6 0 and interpreted to mean that "mediocrity is being used to
educate the future profession." 61
In 1959, the retiring President of the American Bar Association
proclaimed problems of legal education the profession's first respon-
sibility. He urged professional support for further study of prelegal
education and for further education for professional responsibility.
And he advocated prompt action on a program to provide addi-
tional financial support for the law schools.6 2 It is now more than
five years later and no action has yet been taken. 2a
The question of professional competence reaches, of course,
beyond matters of education to those of standards for admission
54Id. at 713. See also A.A.L.S., Anatomy of Modern Legal Education 110-11
(1961).
55 49 A.B.AJ. 984, 998 (1963) ; American B. News, February 15, 1963, p. 5.
56 Cantrall, "Law Schools and the Layman," 38 A.B.A.J. 907 (1952); Frank, "A
Plea for Lawyer Schools," 56 Yale L.J. 1303 (1947) ; Frank, "Both Ends Against the
Middle," 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 20 (1951).
57 Clark, "Practical Legal Training an Illusion," 3 J. Legal Ed. 423 (1951);
Sturges, "The Profession and Legal Education," 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 11 (1950).
58 See A.A.L.S., Pre-Legal Education (1952) ; University of Michigan Conference
on Legal Education, The Law Schools Look Ahead (1959) ; Vanderbilt, "A Report on
Prelegal Education," 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 199 (1950) ; Vanderbilt, "Prelegal Education,"
17 B. Exam. 85, 107 (1948).
6986 A.B.A. Rep. 703, 712 (1961). See also A.A.L.S., Anatomy of Modern Legal
Education 264 (1961) ; Nicholson, The Law Schools of the United States (1958).
6
o Crotty, "A Threat to Legal Education," 6 J. Legal Ed. 166 (1953).
61 Nicholson, The Law Schools of the United States 171 (1958).
C2 Malone, "Our First Responsibility," 45 A.B.A.J. 1023 (1959).
62a In October, 1964, the A.B.A. established a law student loan fund with an
initial lending capacity of $2,000,000. American B. News, November 15, 1964, p. 1.
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to practice. The improvement of law school education is a poor
protection against incompetence if, as is still true in a number of
states, including one of our largest, applicants may qualify to take
the bar examination without attending law school.63 Then reliance
must be placed on the standards imposed for law office study or
upon the bar examinations-and where applicants can qualify for
bar examinations by taking correspondence courses, the chief re-
liance must be upon the bar examination. We have little information
about the standards applicable to law office study. About the bar
examinations we know from the work of the Survey of the Legal
Profession that some are good, some are poor, and that there is no
uniformity.64 However, the American Bar Association and the
Association of American Law Schools have approved a code of
standards for bar examiners. 65
Today questions of training and of standards are involved
also in a phenomenon which has been with us some time but which
grows increasingly important-the matter of specialization in prac-
tice and the question of formulating standards for the certification
of specialists. The problem was raised and shelved a decade ago,6
and it is now raised again.67 The debate will doubtless be as heated
as it was before; 68 certainly it will not be permanently ended until
the problem is solved.
Unauthorized practice
A necessary concomitant of the establishment of standards for
the practice of law is, of course, the prohibition of practice by those
who do not meet the standards. The principal difficulty lies in
defining the "practice of law" from which the unlicensed are to be
excluded. Logically, the definition should not encompass any activ-
ity for which licensing standards do not require special qualifica-
tions. Only this much can be justified in terms of protecting the
public. Beyond this point, an effort to exclude the unlicensed bears
63 A.B.A. Section of Legal Education, Law Schools and Bar Admission Require-
ments 27-32 (1963).
64 See Survey of the Legal Profession, Bar Examinations and Requirements for
Admission to the Bar (1952).
65 Crotty, "Better Lawyers for Tomorrow: Code of Standards for Bar Examiners,"
45 A.B.A.J. 583 (1959).
66 See 79 A.B.A. Rep. 403, 450, 582 (1954).
67 See Reports of the Special Committee on Recognition and Regulation of
Specialization in Law Practice, 87 A.B.A. Rep. 361, 800 (1962).
68 See Cantrall, "A Country Lawyer Looks at 'Specialization,"' 48 A.BA.J. 1117
(1962) ; Drinker, "Legal Specialists," 41 A.B.A.J. 691 (1955) ; Joiner, "Specialization
in the Law," 39 A.B.A.J. 539 (1953) and 41 A.B.A.J. 1105 (1955) ; Siddal, "Speciali-
zation in the Law," 42 A.B.A.J. 625 (1956) ; Tweed, "The Changing Practice of Law:
The Question of Specialization," 48 A.BA.J. 423 (1962) ; Wham, "Specialization in
the Law," 42 A.B.A.J. 39 (1956).
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the appearance of an effort to extend the monopoly beyond the
reasons which inspired its grant.
Unfortunately, efforts to combat "unauthorized practice' not
infrequently bear that appearance. Dean Griswold has cautioned
that in the approach to the problem of unauthorized practice of tax
law the legal profession should remember that "most accountants
are much better qualified to handle the ordinary tax matter than
are many lawyers." " Attorneys have been repeatedly admonished
that efforts to combat unauthorized practice in new and developing
areas are not an adequate substitute for developing proficiency in
those areas. 70 The most careful and systematic study of the problem
yet made concludes that "the near-monopoly of lawyers in per-
forming difficult legal tasks has become increasingly threatened in
some fields by skilled lay specialists such as accountants, estate
planners, and title companies" because "these lay specialists are
competent, clients are attracted to them, and they often can under-
cut lawyers' fees. In the future, this threat and encroachment will
become greater as an even more complex society produces more
skilled lay specialists." 71
To the extent that lawyers seek to prevent others from per-
forming a service attorneys are not qualified to perform, they are
in an untenable position for which no public support can be ex-
pected. Indeed, public support for a valid position in a given case
may be lost if efforts against unauthorized practice in other cases
appear to be untenable. And it is the support of the public which
the bar must have in the last analysis. It will not do merely to
persuade a court in a particular case that its cause is just. Courts,
as the citizenry of Arizona recently reminded, may be overruled by
constitutional amendments. In that state a decision of its Supreme
Court holding that real estate brokers were engaged in illegal prac-
tice in drafting and filling out forms 72 was promptly followed by a
constitutional amendment-passed by a four-to-one popular vote-
expressly authorizing the brokers to engage in such practices."
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC LEADERSHIP
Lawyers can and do provide leadership for their fellow citizens
in a variety of ways. They may formally assume the duties of
9 Griswold, "A Further Look: Lawyers and Accountants," 41 A.B.A.J. 1113
(1955).
70 Tweed, The Changing Practice of Law 10-11 (1955) ; Tweed, "The Changing
Practice of Law: The Question of Specialization," 48 A.B.A.J. 423 (1962).
71 Johnstone, "The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A Struggle Among Power
Groups," 4 Kan. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
72 State Bar of Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P2d
1 (1961), on rehearing, 91 Ariz. 293, 371 P.2d 1020 (1962).
73 Ariz. Const. art. 26, § 1. See Marks, "The Lawyers and the Realtors: Arizona's
Experience," 49 A.B.A.J. 139 (1963).
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public office. They may become leaders in political organizations or
movements, or they may become leaders in a variety of civic or-
ganizations and undertakings.
Public oflce
It is, of course, well known that lawyers preponderate in the
Congress, that they constitute the first or second largest occupa-
tional group (sometimes being outnumbered by the farmers) in
most state legislatures, and that they hold many of the positions,
legal and non-legal, elective and appointive, in the executive
branches of the states and of the nation. And they occupy all save
the lowest rank of judicial offices. The fact that this is so raises a
number of questions for the profession.
Lawyers, to be sure, are the dominant occupational group in
Congress and the state legislatures, but are they, by and large,
the lawyers we would like to think of as the better lawyers, the
stars of our profession? To be local about it, how many Whitney
Seymours, Louis Loebs, and Harry Tweeds do you find in the
typical state legislatures? ... I ask the same question about our
judges. Our Traynors, Fulds, Breitels and Schaefers would be
stars in any league, but how many such genuinely superior men
are there on appellate courts and trial courts of general jurisdic-
tion, and what can we do to see that the bar offers not of its
average but of its best - and that the offer is taken up by those
in political power? 74
Apart from the judiciary, do lawyers have any special compe-
tence for public office? Some argue that they do-that the attor-
neys' training in analysis, flexibility of mind, diversity of experience
and professional skills are extremely valuable attributes which make
them well qualified for public leadership. 5 Others have disagreed:
The answer is obviously "yes" whenever a technical knowledge
of the law is involved. But in regard to other qualifications, the
lawyer is neither specifically trained for leadership nor is leader-
ship training or ability lacking in many other occupations. It might
even be said that some of the traditional skills of the lawyer, such
as public speaking, have become less common among members
of the bar along with increasing specialization. Furthermore, the
great complexity of community life requires a wide variety of
experts in the formulation and administration of policies. Techni-
cal knowledge other than the law is needed. One might conclude
that the greater specialization in law practice and the more ex-
tensive division of labor in the community both tend to make the
74 H. W. Jones, "Comment," in Legal Institutions Today and Tomorrow 197-98
(Paulsen ed. 1959) ; "It is often heard around statehouses that on the whole lawyer-
legislators are below par as lawyers go." Derge, The Lawyer as Decision-Maker in
the American State Legislature, 21 J. Politics 408, 412 (1959).
75 See, e.g., Nelson, Developing Responsible Public Leaders 49-50 (1962).
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legal specialist less specifically fitted for positions of general
leadership. There is no reason why a legal specialist should make
a better "generalist" than many other specialists.
7 6
Is it true that lawyers predominate in public office not because
of special competence, but because "the law is the profession most
compatible with a political career," 7 7 or because political candidacy
is "a traditional form of professional advertising"? "
If, for whatever reason, lawyers are to continue to occupy
numerous public offices, does this call for re-examination of legal
education to take account of the demands which will be made upon
them? Some have thought so,19 but there is little indication that
their views have yet had much impact on legal education. At the
very least, there seems to be need for education on problems of
conflict of interest as they will appear for the lawyer while he is in
and after he leaves public office.80
Political leadership
The Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Respon-
sibility claimed for the lawyer special competence to improve public
discussion of political and economic issues by defining objectives
and by designing frameworks for achieving those objectives. It also
urged that law be "so practiced that the lawyer remains free to
make up his own mind how he will vote, what causes he will support,
what economic and political philosophy he will espouse."
Unfortunately, law is not always so practiced. As the late
Arthur Vanderbilt described it:
The leaders of many industries deem it necessary to keep out
of politics, officially at any rate, and they often expect their law-
yers to do so too. The attitude of many clients, particularly in the
larger communities, toward the politics of their attorneys has had
its baleful influence. They prefer their lawyers not to be active
politically, but at the same time to have political contacts if they
should be needed in furtherance of their clients' affairs. They look
with favor, therefore, on law firms made up of members of both
76 Wood & Wardell, "The Lawyer and Community Leadership," 9 J. Legal Ed.
162, 171 (1956).
77 Schlesinger, "Lawyers and American Politics: A Clarified View," 1 Midwest J.
Pol. Sci. 26, 27 (1957).
78 Blaustein & Porter, The American Lawyer 98 (1954).
79 See Goodman & Rabinowitz, "Lawyer Opinion on Legal Education," 64 Yale
L.J. 537 (1955); Lasswell & McDougal, "Legal Education and Public Policy: Pro-
fessional Training in the Public Interest," 52 Yale L.J. 203 (1943) ; McDougal, "The
Law School of the Future; From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Com-
munity," 56 Yale L.J. 1345 (1947) ; Sturges, "The Profession and Legal Education,"
23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 11 (1940).
80 See Conflict of Interest and Federal Service (1960), a report of a special
committee of The Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
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political parties so that the partnership may have a foot in each
camp. Not only the ethics but the effectiveness of this point of
view may be questioned, but the fact that it represents a wide-
spread opinion of clients in selecting lawyers cannot be gainsaid. 81
To this it has been added that the lawyer's
participation in local political affairs evinces lack of understand-
ing, callous indifference, or sometimes hostility. With few excep-
tions, lawyers have not busied themselves with the functioning
of local government. Of those legal brethren who have, a fraction
have done so unselfishly and as a civic duty. The great mass of
lawyers supinely accept evil political conditions in their locality
or, worse, abet them. The "political lawyer," the lobbyist or the
fixer is the common conception of a lawyer in local politics.8 2
These are the observations of respected members of the legal pro-
fession. They raise serious questions of professional default if there
is a professional responsibility in this area.
Civic leadership
Not all public leadership is "political" in the sense that it
relates to political parties and their campaigns and candidates.
Much of community life consists of and is affected by nonpolitical
organizations and movements. To the extent that the lawyer is
qualified and responsible for political leadership he may be similarly
qualified and responsible for nonpolitical civic leadership. Certainly
it is the practice of the leaders of our profession to exhort the
neophytes to such leadership. To what extent do lawyers provide
such leadership? There are no comprehensive studies, but the re-
sults of a couple of samples give some indication.
A decade ago, when Elmira, New York, was a city of about
50,000 with about eighty practicing attorneys, a survey revealed
that the lawyers, on the average, were active in five organizations,
four times the average for the entire adult population and twice
the average for adult males who had attended college. The lawyers
themselves viewed their participation as valuable to their profes-
sional careers in terms of building an acquaintanceship, providing
an opportunity to demonstrate ability, enhancing reputation and
increasing opportunities for client contacts. But they also felt that
the community expected such participation from them and they
expected it of each other-there was general disapproval of the
lawyer who did not do his share.8 3
s1 Vanderbilt, Men and Measures in the Law 46 (1959).
8 2 Seasongood, "Public Service by Lawyers in Local Government," 2 Syracuse L.
Rev. 210, 211 (1951).8 3 Matthews, The Lawyer as a Community Leader: One Dimension of a Pro-
fessional Role, 1952 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University).
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In 1956, interviews of 215 or forty per cent of the lawyers
in a large southern city, and fifty-one of the fifty-three lawyers in
a small New England town produced less encouraging results.
Counting membership "in virtually any type of community organ-
izations-including religious, philanthropic, social service, purely
social and recreational, professional, and cultural associations,"
about half of the lawyers were members of five or fewer nonpolitical
organizations and almost one-third of them were members of fewer
than three. One-third of them had never held an office in any such
organization. Only seventeen per cent of them believed that they
should be active in community affairs or politics and forty-seven
per cent were opposed to "law school training on broad social ques-
tions in preparation for policy-making positions." Twenty-two per
cent said they participated in politics and eleven per cent in other
community activities only to further their practices. Thirteen per
cent said they dropped their community activities after their prac-
tices were established. Six per cent admitted that their community
activity was forced upon them by civic organizations."- Here again,
if there is a professional responsibility, the bar may be in default-
or at least in need of improvement.
RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE PROFESSION
In a sense all other areas of professional responsibility pre-
viously suggested in this paper might be viewed as responsibilities to
the profession, although larger responsibilities are also involved.
But there are at least two matters which may be described as
uniquely the lawyer's responsibilities to his profession.
Canons of ethics
The Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908, as subsequently amended, are officially
adopted as standards for professional performance in some states.
Where not so adopted they are nonetheless of great influence in
disciplinary matters. For all practicing lawyers they are a guide
to proper professional conduct.
There is some feeling that these Canons are in need of revision
and modernizing. In large part, they seem applicable only to the
trial of cases in court-perhaps a reflection of the date of their
origin. Where they do apply, it is not clear that they in all respects
represent the professional consensus as to propriety.8 A special
committee of the American Bar Foundation in 1958 reported that
the Canons were weakened by an intermixture of statements of
84 See Wood & Wardell, supra note 76.
85 See McCracken, "Report on Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional
Standards," 37 Va. L. Rev. 399 (1951).
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abstract ideals with standards of conduct, that insofar as they
constituted standards of conduct there were serious omissions on
modern problems of law practice, and that they were not well
adapted to use as standards for the basis of discipline.86 Whether or
to what extent these complaints are justified must be a matter
within the responsibility of a profession which so widely recognizes
the Canons as authoritative standards of conduct. 81a
Bar associations
If a profession is to discharge its other responsibilities, it must
be organized. Only through organization is there an opportunity
for collective judgment and for implementation of that judgment.
After rapid gains in membership in the last few years, the
American Bar Association has now enrolled 114,000, or about forty-
five per cent, of some 250,000 practicing lawyers. There is no com-
prehensive information as to membership in state and local bar
associations save that it is one hundred per cent in those twenty-six
state bar associations which are integrated. Even where the bar is
integrated, formal membership is one thing, and active, intelligent,
participating membership is another. It is obvious that the profes-
sion still needs to be concerned about its organization. And to the
extent that the integrated bar seemed to offer a solution, Latkrop
v. Donahue s1 raises a host of new problems of professional concern."'
CONCLUSION
The areas outlined seem to me to constitute the minimal, the
indispensable, ingredients of any modern concept of professional
responsibility. Some may disagree, and they may be right: no
better warrant is claimed for these remarks than that they repre-
sent the views of one who has worried considerably about the
responsibilities of the legal profession. But before anyone concludes
finally that he must disagree with what has been said, I urge him
to ask himself two questions. Are the questions raised here deserv-
ing of further public attention? If so, who are better qualified to
bring them to public attention and to insure their intelligent con-
sideration than the lawyers?
86 Report of the Special Committee of the American Bar Foundation on Canons of
Ethics, June 30, 1958.
86a In August, 1964, the A.B.A. created a special committee to evaluate and
recommend changes in the Canons. American B. News, September 15, 1964, p. 1.
87 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
88 See also two mimeographed reports of Columbia University's Bureau of Applied
Social Research: Glaser, "The Organization of the Integrated Bar" (1960) and
Glaser, "The Debate Over the Integrated Bar" (1960).
